My semester is finally over and my first year of PhD studies is behind me. I’ve learned a ton this semester in terms of understanding how to think about international interactions.
Responding to China seems to dominate the thinking of many international relations experts for obvious reasons, but concern and distrust seem to dominate the analysis. Indeed, there’s a stark divide in the recent edition of Foreign Affairs between optimistic Chinese intellectuals, and everyone else when it comes to viewing China’s rise.
One of the leading figures in the generally pessimistic view on China is John Mearsheimer, one of the author’s I read this semester. For my final, I had to write an essay responding to a recent interview he gave to the Asian Times on China.
I’ve posted the essay below with some adjustments to make it a little more readable on a webpage. If you want my sources, let me know.
Mearsheimer’s Inconsistent Realism
In analyzing the probability of conflict with China, anticipating China’s strategic goals, and prioritizing strategic over economic concerns, Mearsheimer departs from key elements of offensive realism.
First, Mearsheimer sees conflict with China as being likely if China continues to grow economically. In Mearsheimer’s book, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, offensive realism postulates that a revisionist challenging power would prompt the formation of balancing coalition to prevent its rise. However, the type of military-based balancing that Mearsheimer’s theory would predict is not happening. America is not encouraging Japan’s offensive rearmament, or creating an Asian NATO.
Second, Mearsheimer argues that China’s goal is to establish regional and global dominance. This is rhetorically consistent with offensive realism, but is contradictory in substance. As evidence of his definition of China’s strategic goals, Mearsheimer points to China’s offshore aggression (the South China Sea, Senkaku Islands, and Taiwan), but offensive realism posits land-based power as the path to hegemony. Offensive realism dictates land dominance as the means to establishing hegemonic dominance, but China is engaging on the naval level as though it were an offshore balancer.
If China means to be an offshore balancer, then such a role actually turns offensive realism on its head as Mearsheimer spends two full chapters in his book describing the more peaceful hegemonic behavior of off shore balancers like America and Britain.
Third, Mearsheimer explicitly says in the interview that “strategic considerations are much more important than economic considerations.” This fundamentally undercuts offensive realism’s own definition of power. In offensive realism, military capability is explicitly linked to a country’s power capability, and in fact Mearsheimer says it’s the most important aspect of a state’s power. In order to have a military that can project power in an offensive realist environment one must have economic means. One cannot separate the two. If strategy is put before economy, then there will be no military to execute strategy.
Is There a Better Way of Understanding China’s Rise?
Offensive realism does not accurately explain, or predict possible conflict scenarios with China, its naval adventurism, nor its willingness to forsake economic for strategic gain. Mearsheimer needs a better theory to explain these phenomena. So he uses power transition theory.
Power transition theory explains the likelihood of conflict between America and China more readily because it suggests that if China is dissatisfied with the international status quo and is approaching 80 percent of America’s power capability, then it will be more likely to engage in conflicts. This theory more accurately accounts for China’s aggressive behavior in terms of its dissatisfaction with the status quo and viewing itself as a challenger to the United States. Additionally, transition theory links a country’s economy to its power share, which helps establish certain strategic choices.
There are at least two other perspectives that address Mearsheimer’s concerns on China more effectively than offensive realism. The first is Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman’s game theory-based international interactions game from their book War and Reason, which argues that domestic concerns have a great influence on foreign policy. Such an interactive dynamic between domestic and foreign policy can explain China’s seemingly odd foreign policy choices and its apparent willingness to jeopardize its international trade volume. The international interactions game posits that at the terminal nodes of the game, nationally beneficial outcomes are preferred and form the framework within which “rational decision-making” is done.
Within these parameters there can be a rational basis for conflict, which can explain China’s regional aggression in terms of domestic nationalism and economic pressures. If domestic politics define national interests, which in turn shape foreign policy (economics again driving strategy), then it should come as no surprise that China turns its attention to its littoral zone as being an area within which the majority of its economic activity takes place, and where it is thus most strategically vulnerable.
The second explanatory theory is power cycle theory. Power cycle theory seeks to put power transitions into a larger historical context. Charles Doran analyzes the effects of the development and decline of states on the international system by paralleling the rise and fall of a state’s power share with other powers over the course of time. Doran notes the presence of “inflection” points in a state’s development where its power share, relative to other powers in the international system, may not increase as rapidly. This usually creates national concern and even aggression as a gap opens between a state’s capability and self-perception.
Power cycle theory applied to the rise of China, suggests that conflict between China and other powers can happen not just at the point of power transition, but at multiple points along China’s power cycle. China may not rise as fast, America may not decline at the same rate, or China may feel like its international role is not in keeping with its position and place. Conflict can occur at any of these points.
Applying Power Cycle Theory to China
Power cycle theory can optimally address the areas of concern in Mearsheimer’s argument addressed above. First, the likelihood of an American vs. China conflict does not have to be inevitable. As China’s power approaches parity with America, power cycle theory provides a critical marker for America to be aware of: Constrained ascendance.
Whether China’s rivals seek to slow it down, or China’s economy does not grow as fast as anticipated, a situation develops in which chances of conflict increase. If a gap exists between China’s power and its role in the international system, then the risk of conflict is significantly higher. China can then be anticipated to grow aggressive, particularly towards America and its Asian allies.
Second, power cycle theory addresses China’s littoral aggression by recognizing it as the rise of a great power unhappy with its role in the region and the international system. While offensive realism would suggest China compete with Russia and India as land-based powers, power cycle theory accounts for China’s particular type of regional dominance, one that is more focused on maritime issues and competition with America.
Finally, economic growth is clearly linked to military growth and is a core element of a country’s power profile in power cycle theory (Doran, 1991). The tension between engaging in conflict harmful to its economic interests is a foreign policy decision that power cycle theory places later in a country’s power cycle as it starts to decline (Doran, 1991). Therefore, Mearsheimer’s assessment of China as paradoxically being willing to throw away economic standing as it is still a rising power (e.g. attacking Taiwan) is better explained by moving such a foreign policy decision further back in China’s power cycle.
Responding to China Without Triggering War
Mearsheimer believes that Europe and the Middle East have become distractions to America pivoting to balance China. However, according to power cycle theory, such a pivot would merely exacerbate a conflict scenario. China would feel it’s moment of regional dominance threatened and assume that America is denying it a place in the international system of Great Powers.
This would represent, in Doran’s words “trauma of expectations foregone.” China would feel compelled to forcibly retake its ascendant momentum.
Far from confronting China by balancing with Japan, or resisting their movement into other areas of Asia as Mearsheimer suggests, power cycle theory would advocate that China be given a greater role in the current status quo, moving it from being a dissatisfied revisionist power to being a satisfied power. To the extent that China is unlikely to trigger a war before an economic downturn, or its power peaks, now would be the time for further integration, not isolation.
Engaging China’s endeavors at international leadership (i.e. the AIIB), incorporating the Chinese navy into maintaining security in the South China Sea, and including it in the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations are all potential avenues through which America can aid China’s peaceful rise without being needlessly antagonizing. This is not to say that China’s every whim should be granted, but without allowing China to have some stake in its region and the international system commensurate with its power, America reduces its ability to ensure a peaceful power transition.